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Approaches to understanding adaptive behaviour often assume that animals
have perfect information about environmental conditions or are capable of
sophisticated learning. If such learning abilities are costly, however, natural
selection will favour simpler mechanisms for controlling behaviour when
faced with uncertain conditions. Here, we show that, in a foraging context,
a strategy based only on current energy reserves often performs almost as
well as a Bayesian learning strategy that integrates all previous experiences
to form an optimal estimate of environmental conditions. We find that
Bayesian learning gives a strong advantage only if fluctuations in the food
supply are very strong and reasonably frequent. The performance of both
the Bayesian and the reserve-based strategy are more robust to inaccurate
knowledge of the temporal pattern of environmental conditions than a strat-
egy that has perfect knowledge about current conditions. Studies assuming
Bayesian learning are often accused of being unrealistic; our results suggest
that animals can achieve a similar level of performance to Bayesians using
much simpler mechanisms based on their physiological state. More broadly,
our work suggests that the ability to use internal states as a source of infor-
mation about recent environmental conditions will have weakened selection
for sophisticated learning and decision-making systems.1. Introduction
‘Il meglio e` nemico del bene’ [‘The best is enemy of the good’]
Italian proverbThe study of animal decision-making has typically taken an optimization
approach in which the animal is assumed to have perfect knowledge of current
and long-term conditions [1–4]. In reality, animals will be uncertain about con-
ditions [5]. Such uncertainty can be incorporated into evolutionary models using
Bayes’s rule, which updates knowledge given new information in a logically con-
sistent way [6,7], invoking the behavioural gambit [8] that animals will behave
as though they can perform Bayesian calculations [9,10]. However, it remains
unclear how most animals could approximate Bayesian learning without invok-
ing implausible computational abilities or excessively costly physiological or
cognitive mechanisms that would require a large brain. For a mechanism to be
favoured by selection, there needs to be sufficient advantage to the animal in
terms of reproductive success to offset the costs of the mechanism. In many situ-
ations, a simpler but less accurate mechanism, determining a ‘rule of thumb’ or
heuristic, might be advantageous if it has a smaller cost [11]. An example is
simple learning rules based on a linear operator [12]. Such rules may also be
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is less affected if information is imperfect [12,13].
One of the best-studied situations in decision-making is
searching for food [4,14,15]. Described rules of thumb include
the ‘two-strikes’ rule that bees (Bombus lapidarius) appear to
follow in making patch-quitting decisions [16]; the animal
acts as though it has a fixed memory window for foraging suc-
cess, such as remembering whether or not it found food on the
last few occasions that it looked. Another example is the con-
stant time in patches used by caddis fly larvae (Plectrocnemia
conspersa) [17]; here the animal acts as though it keeps track
of time and ignores changes in conditions. Both methods
may lead to behaviour that is similar to a more sophisticated
system that tracks food availability explicitly [16,17].
To behave optimally in different conditions, the animal
needs some way of assessing current conditions. In the case
of foraging, the animal discovers food items stochastically,
which does not necessarily reflect the overall food abundance
at that point in time. Animals therefore need some way to
integrate past events, but acquiring and processing infor-
mation in a Bayesian way is likely to be costly [18]. Instead,
natural selection could exploit the fact that animals have
internal states that are a potential source of information
about conditions. All else being equal, energetic reserves
tend to increase if food is abundant and fall if food is scarce.
Since conditions are positively autocorrelated over time in
most natural environments, conditions in the recent past are
informative of current conditions [5]. As such, reserves could
act as a physiological ‘memory’ of environmental conditions
and so indicate current conditions [19].
Here, we show that energy reserves, a physiological state,
provides a simple yet surprisingly effective cue to decide how
intensively to forage for food. For clarity, we use a simple
model of survival in a fluctuating environment (i.e. the gen-
eralized risk allocation model of [20]), where food availability
varies over time. We characterize the animal’s environment in
terms of the distribution, variability and abundance of food
items. We investigate under what conditions we expect ani-
mals to behave as though they have sophisticated learning
mechanisms for assessing current conditions, when they
should have simpler mechanisms and when they should
ignore fluctuations in conditions altogether. To predict the
outcome of natural selection it would be necessary to quan-
tify the cost of mental mechanisms, but this is currently not
possible. We therefore compare the survivorship of various
candidate mechanisms to understand when sophisticated
mechanisms give large benefits, in which case animals are
unlikely to have simple mechanisms. We find that, across a
wide range of situations, a strategy based only on the level
of reserves performs almost as well as optimal Bayesian
learning, despite being much simpler, because reserve level
acts as a memory. We discuss how such mechanisms
may operate in non-foraging contexts too, and suggest that
physiological states acting as ‘memories’ may be ubiquitous.2. The model
We are interested in the foraging strategy that maximizes sur-
vival in a temporally changing environment where death can
occur through starvation or predation. One possible response
to harsh conditions is to cease activity and wait for better
times, but the consequences of this for the forager’s survivaland future state will depend on its current reserves. We there-
fore use a state-dependent model in which the optimal action
is allowed to depend on both the current conditions and the
current level of reserves. We model behaviour over a long
sequence of discrete time steps. The animal and its environ-
ment are characterized by two states: its level of reserves x
(x  0) and the current environmental conditions E where
food availability is higher in good conditions (E ¼ G) than
bad conditions (E ¼ B). Food availability differs only in the
maximum probability of finding food when foraging (gG
and gB, where gG  gB).
The food availability of the environment is assumed to fluc-
tuate over time. Incorporating environmental heterogeneity
into models of adaptive behaviour requires the inclusion of an
environmental state variable [5]. Oftenwe can capture sufficient
complexity with just two possible environmental states A and
B, such as high and low food availability. Next, we characterize
stochastic transitions between the two environmental states.
The simplest case is where the probability of transition (per
unit time) between states depends only on the current state.
At the end of a time step, we assume that the environment
changes from the current conditions E to the alternative
conditions with probability lE. Thus, a good environment
becomes a bad environment with probability lG, while a bad
environment becomes a good environment with probability
lB. The duration of both good and bad periods follow a geo-
metric distribution whose mean is the reciprocal of the
transition probabilities, which we term tG and tB, respectively.
Note that this environment will show positive temporal auto-
correlation if lB þ lG, 1 because then conditions are more
likely to stay the same than to change [5].
The aspect of behaviour we are interested in is foraging
intensity, which we call f (0  f  1). Increasing f increases
the probability of finding food but also increases exposure
to predators and hence the probability of being attacked.
We assume that while the animal is not foraging, it is safe
from predation. We also assume that predation risk when
foraging increases with energy reserves x because of decreas-
ing manoeuvrability [21]. (Regardless of the exact cost, some
cost needs to be assumed if long-term adaptive fat levels are
to be stable [22].) In a given time step, the probability of
mortality of the animal due to predation (m) is given by
mðx,fÞ ¼ f cd 1
2
þ x
s
 
, ð2:1Þ
where c controls how the risk increases with f, d is the maxi-
mum probability of predator attack, and s is the maximum
reserve level. We assume that the forager uses m units of
energy per time step on metabolism and finds a food item
with probability gEf. For computational reasons, there is
some variance in the energy content of food items (see elec-
tronic supplementary material [hereafter ESM], appendix):
food items contain either b1 or b2 units of energy; for the
results shown in the main text, we assume that items with
energy b1 ¼ 5 and b2 ¼ 6 occur with equal probability. The
reserves at the next time step are therefore
xtþ1 ¼ xt þ bj m
after a successful discovery of food item of type j ( j ¼ 1,2),
and
xtþ1 ¼ xt m
Table 1. Parameters in the model and their default values.
symbol description value
s maximum level of reserves 100
m energy use per unit time 1
bj energy in food item type j 5, 6
d maximum probability of predator attack 0.002
c power of relationship between foraging and predation risk 2
c survival cost per time step for reserve-based strategies 0.001, 0.004
k relative cost of Bayesian compared with reserve-based strategy 2
gE probability of ﬁnding food per unit time spent foraging in environment in condition E gG ¼ 0.7, gB ¼ 0.3
lE probability that environment in condition E changes to the other condition lG ¼ 0.01, lB ¼ 0.01
tE mean number of time steps for which environment stays in condition E (tE ¼ 1/lE) tG ¼ 100, tB ¼ 100
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animal is dead.
A strategy specifies how f depends on circumstances (e.g.
reserves, information). We find optimal strategies of various
classes, all of which minimize the mortality rate and so maxi-
mize the survival probability over a long time period. The
classes of strategy differ in the constraints on the information
available to the forager. Where the current environmental
state E is known (perfect information), this is the generalized
risk allocation model [20]. Where E is not known, the forager
may be able to estimate it based on available cues. To model
this, we include a state variable r to represent the forager’s
estimated probability that conditions are currently good (i.e.
that E ¼ G). Here we find the optimal strategy f* from two
classes of strategy in which information is imperfect: (i) the
animal estimates the probability r that conditions are cur-
rently good directly from its foraging experiences, using
Bayesian updating; (ii) the animal does not monitor its fora-
ging experiences directly but is sensitive to its current
energy reserves, and can take into account the fact that the
level of reserves is informative of recent conditions to esti-
mate r. Assuming that the forager is optimally adapted to
minimize its long-term mortality rate, we use dynamic pro-
gramming to find optimal solutions given the constraints
on information (see ESM, appendix A). We set other par-
ameter values (m, d, c, bj) such that the risk of mortality
over some long time period is realistic. If each time step is
thought of as around 1 h, then 2000 time steps represent
around 100 days of winter, over which the animals try to sur-
vive. Small birds in temperate regions survive winter with
50–70% probability [23–25], so we tune the parameters
such that the survival at the baseline parameter values is
around this range. As mortality is far from both zero and
one, this ensures that the model can make clear predictions
about the effects of the parameter values of interest on the
performance of the various strategies.
We compare the performance of these constrained opti-
mal strategies to two other classes of strategy that would be
optimal if the environmental conditions were unchanging:
(1) A ‘pessimistic’ class of strategy that behaves as though the
food availability is constantly low (gB). (We do not show
results for the alternative ‘optimistic’ strategy that behaves
as though food availability is constantly high (gG), because
it performs very poorly in all non-trivial conditions.)(2) An optimally biased strategy that behaves as though the
food availability is high with a fixed probability and
low otherwise, where the fixed probability is that which
is optimal, and so will have been naturally selected for
in the absence of any attempt to track food availability.
Thus, in summary we compare the performance of five
classes of strategy:
— Perfect (P): Forager has perfect knowledge about current
food availability.
— Bayesian (L): Forager uses Bayes’s theorem to estimate cur-
rent food availability directly from its foraging experiences.
— Reserves (R): Forager does not monitor its foraging experi-
ences but can base its decisions on its current reserve level;
note that, through natural selection, the response to reserves
will be influenced by the conditional probability that food
availability is high given the reserve level.
— Pessimist (S): Forager behaves as though the current food
availability is always low.
— Optimal bias (U ): Forager behaves as though the current
food availability is high with a fixed probability r*, which
is the estimate that minimizes the long-term mortality rate.
For each class, we find the optimal foraging strategy as a
function of reserves and information state. We then assess the
resulting survival over 2000 time steps starting from the
stationary distribution of x in the population. To do this,
we simulate a population following the optimal strategy
until the distribution of individuals stops changing, rescale
so the size of the population is unity, and then run for 2000
time steps to determine the survival probability Q(i), where
i indicates one of the strategy classes as shown above. All
parameters and their baseline values are shown in table 1.3. Results
When using the reserve-based strategy (class R) the probability
that conditions are good as a function of reserves x is shown in
figure 1. For all parameter settings, the probability follows a
sigmoid curve, with a low probability that conditions are
good at low reserves and a high probability at high reserves,
because reserves gradually build up when food is abundant
and decrease when food is scarce. The curve shifts to the
right as the difference between gG and gB increases, because
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conditions to prepare for bad conditions. The steepness of
the sigmoid curve depends on the fluctuation rate (ESM,
figure B1).
The optimal foraging intensity f* for all five strategy
classes is shown in figure 2 for the baseline parameter
values (with the differences in foraging intensity plotted in
ESM, figure B2). As we have shown previously [20], there
is a crossover point in the optimal intensity of foraging
under perfect information f*P (grey lines), with more intense
foraging when food availability is low if reserves are low
[ f*P(x,B). f*P(x,G) when x, 30], but less intense foraging
when food availability is low if reserves are high
[ f*P(x,B), f*P(x,G) when x  30]. A pessimist has f*S that is
too high because it does not expect good conditions to
occur at all. For the reserve-based optimal strategy, foraging
intensity f*R is similar to f*P(x,B) when reserves are low and
closer to f*P(x,G) when reserves are high (compare grey and
dotted lines). This is intuitive, because the lower the reserve
level, the more likely it is that conditions are bad, hence the
animal should behave as though conditions are bad; whereas
if reserves are high it is likely that conditions are good, hence
the animal should behave as though conditions are good. For
the Bayesian learning strategy, f*L is similar to f*P(x,B) when
the posterior probability that conditions are currently good r
is zero and similar to f*P(x,G) when r is unity, with a gradual
change in f*L for intermediate r (ESM, figure B3).
We assess the probability of surviving 2000 time steps for
each optimal strategy under various conditions (figure 3;
shown for gB ¼ 0.25 and gG ¼ 0.75, for other values see
ESM, figure B4). For clarity, we first show survival under per-
fect knowledge (P, which always does best) and then the
differences between the various strategies. Survival always
increases with the mean duration of good periods and
decreases with the mean duration of bad periods because mor-
tality mostly occurs in bad periods, and the length of these
therefore determines survival (figure 3a; ESM, figure B4a–e).
Survival decreases as the difference in food availability
increases because that determines the severity of bad periods,except that survival increases with the difference in food avail-
ability if conditions are good most of the time (cf. ESM, figure
B4a,d), because the increased rate of gain in good periods
more than compensates for this and risk allocation has a
large benefit.
In general, the difference in survival between perfect
knowledge (P) and the information-constrained strategies
(L, R) is much less than 5% for most conditions. L (Bayesian
learning) does worst compared to P when periods are short
because it is impossible to learn fast enough to perform risk
allocation effectively (figure 3b; ESM, figure B4f–j); this is
exacerbated when food availability differs markedly between
good and bad conditions (ESM, figure B4j). Across parameter
space, there is strikingly little difference between L and the
reserve-based strategy R (figure 3c; ESM, figure B4 k–o),
except when periods are moderately short (around 20 time
steps) and the difference in food availability between con-
ditions is very large (ESM, figure B4o). R does much better
than U (optimal bias) when periods are long and of roughly
equal duration, because then it is most important to do the
correct thing (figure 3d; ESM, figure B4p–t). The optimal esti-
mate r* under the U strategy is always smaller than the actual
r (ESM, figure B5). This is because eating too much in good
conditions is less deleterious than eating too little in poor
conditions.
In figure 4, we clarify the conditions under which a learn-
ing (L) or reserve-based (R) strategy should evolve, under the
arbitrary assumption that L is twice as costly as R. We expect
sophisticated learning to be worth this additional cost when
periods are moderately short and food availability changes
greatly (bottom-left of figure 4b,d) or when the fluctuations
are subtle and infrequent (top-right of figure 4a). We expect
the reserve-based strategy to be favoured if the world is not
predominantly poor or rich (i.e. along the main diagonal of
figure 4) and does not change too quickly (not the bottom-
left). This is because R does not adapt fast enough when
conditions turn bad and so the animal is more likely to die;
in this situation, either L or U does better. In all other cases,
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animal to perform almost as well as a sophisticated Bayesian
learning strategy, with differences less than 1% in most of
parameter space, and 0.04% for the baseline parameter values.
For the results above, we assumed that gG þ gB ¼ 1. How-
ever, the difference between L and R remains small for almost
all combinations of gG and gB (ESM, figure B6). We have also
confirmed that the results are not sensitive to our assump-
tions about the variance in energy consumption over time
(ESM, figure B7). We did this by increasing the energy con-
tent of food items bj while decreasing their rate of discovery
gG and gB, such that the total amount of energy in the
environment remained constant but the variance increased
(implying longer periods without eating). The results are
almost unchanged across the full range of the proportion of
food that occurs under good conditions (ESM, figure B7).
In addition to having imperfect knowledge about current
conditions, a forager’s perception of the pattern ofenvironmental change may be prone to error. This may be
the case because of dispersal or because anthropogenic
change is altering environments faster than animals can
adapt [26]. To investigate this, we assess the performance
of the same five strategy classes in an environment that fluc-
tuates on a different timescale from that to which the forager
is adapted. In figure 5, we present the survivorship relative to
the P case when the strategy is mismatched for the transition
probabilities (for absolute values, see ESM, figure B8). Over-
all the survival of P is poorer than that of R and L if the
perceived rate of environmental change is different to the
actual rate. This occurs because the optimal decision depends
on the forager’s current state and its expectations about the
future; if those expectations are wrong, then performance
will be poor. This is ameliorated if the forager can adjust its
expectations via learning or other changes in state, which are
influenced by the real conditions. At the extreme, if the forager
expects periods to be long then the performance of P worsens
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
285:20172411
7
 on February 15, 2018http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from as the actual period durations decrease (ESM, figure B8),
whereas performance improves for L and R (figure 5g). If
the actual duration of periods is much longer than expected,
then it would be better to act as though conditions are
always poor (S) (figure 5d,f,h), but there is always a range of
perceived durations where L and R outperform P. When the
expected durations are quite inaccurate, the actual durations
determine whether R outperforms L or vice versa: if the
actual durations are long, reserves become a reliable cue of cur-
rent conditions (figure 5f,h), whereas if the actual durations are
short, the Bayesian strategy performs better (figure 5b,d).
The maintained reserve level is similar under L and R but
slightly shifted to lower reserves compared with P for baseline
parameter values (ESM, figure B9). Storing a lower level of
reserves is predicted across most of parameter space (ESM,
figure B10), except where there is a small difference in food
availability between good and bad conditions and conditions
change slowly (ESM, figure B10b, f) or when conditions are
more often good (ESM, figure B10d,h). Across all of parameter
space, reserves under L are closer to those under P than R,
explaining the slightly better performance of L.4. Discussion
The need to track and respond appropriately to environ-
mental conditions generates an important selective pressure
on sensory and cognitive systems. Animals typically do not
have perfect knowledge [27]. While foraging they may learn
about the current food availability, but because food discov-
ery is stochastic there is uncertainty. Given this uncertainty,
animals are likely to have decision rules that perform well
in most conditions [8,11,28]. The level of sophistication of
these rules will depend on their associated costs and the
benefit of tracking the environment. Here, we have compared
the performance of a number of implementations of possible
foraging mechanisms in an environment with fluctuating
food availability. Our findings suggest that a Bayesian learn-
ing strategy—a commonly used paradigm in research on
learning [6,9,12,29] but one which is arguably implausible
for real organisms [6,7] (but see [9,10])—is unlikely to
evolve under most conditions, because a simpler decision
rule based solely on current energy reserves could allow
the animal to perform almost as well. The greatest benefit
to distinguishing between conditions occurs when the
environment fluctuates slowly, but in this case there is
ample time for energetic reserves to respond to current con-
ditions before they change, and so most of the time the
reserve level will be a sufficiently reliable indicator of current
conditions. The ability to behave appropriately using only
energy reserves as a cue is likely to have greatly reduced
the selective pressure for sophisticated learning systems.
Bayesian learning might still be advantageous if other
classes of strategy are very expensive, if there is a strong
difference between conditions (making it more important to
adjust behaviour accordingly) and if conditions change suffi-
ciently fast that reserves are an unreliable cue to current
conditions. This perspective suggests that animals in strongly
and quickly fluctuating environments might be better at
learning, which contradicts the suggestion that learning is
favoured under intermediate rates of change [30,31]; note
that these previous studies did not consider simpler alterna-
tive mechanisms. Strikingly, we predict that animals shouldbe insensitive to some types of environmental fluctuations,
such as if the fluctuations are not very large, or fluctuations
are very quick, or if the world is usually in one state or the
other. The latter result is predicted because if food conditions
are dominated by one level of availability, then animals can
just behave as though this is always the case. With fast
changes or changes of small magnitude, it is less important
to be sensitive to changes in food availability because current
conditions do not provide much information about future
conditions [20]. In experiments that have found no response
to changing conditions [32], it is important to consider
whether the study organism is adapted to an environment
in which there is limited benefit of responding to changes.
In some situations, such as when the level of food avail-
ability changes frequently, it may be that the animal should
do the same thing in the different conditions [20]. In such
cases, an evolved mechanism may implement some simpler
rule that does not try to track conditions (U ). This may
underlie state-dependent valuation of food sources, because
an animal’s state may reflect what conditions were generally
like when particular sources were exploited [33].
The reserve-based strategy class may be the most likely
evolutionary outcome in most situations. Even the simple
rule (U ) requires a basic sensitivity to reserve level to avoid
starvation, and the reserve-based strategy is unlikely to
involve significant additional costs. Thus, animals will not
necessarily carry the level of reserves predicted by standard
models that assume perfect knowledge or Bayesian learning,
but instead may make systematic deviations because they are
using reserves as a source of information. We predict that
these deviations will be positive (more reserves than pre-
dicted by perfect information models) when conditions
change slowly but negative when conditions change quickly
(ESM). There may be no need for a cognitively encoded
memory of recent foraging experiences; natural selection
will simply exploit information by favouring an adaptive
response to energetic reserves. In effect, the animal’s reserves
act as a physiological memory of past events. This suggestion
could be tested empirically in systems where foraging experi-
ences can be decoupled from the perceived level of reserves,
for example, through experimental manipulation of hor-
mones such as ghrelin and leptin that are involved in the
regulation of feeding behaviour. By manipulating hormone
levels and foraging experiences independently of each
other, it should be possible to determine whether foraging be-
haviour is controlled by a cognitively encoded memory, a
reserve-based memory or some combination of the two.
Lea et al. [34] assessed the performance of cognitive mech-
anisms for solving the explore-exploit trade-off. They found
that a simple decision rule can perform better thanmore soph-
isticated strategies in some conditions, such as where there is
insufficient time to learn about current conditions, which is
comparable to the poor performance of our Bayesian learning
strategy when fluctuations are frequent. However, the choice
of foraging currency is likely to be crucial for the insights
obtained [15], and often maximization of net rate as assumed
by Lea et al. [34] will make substantially different predictions
to currencies that incorporate the risk of mortality that most
foragers face [15,35]. Future theoretical work should consider
howa foraging rule based on physiological state, such as a hor-
mone level, performs relative to a cognitive mechanism that
attempts to learn about the level of predation risk from
direct experiences (e.g. sightings of predators).
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learning about conditions can perform much better than
ignorant rules [36,37]. But these rule sets have not accounted
for the fact that internal state, such as the level of energy
reserves or body temperature, always provides animals
with some information and we expect natural selection to
have formed strategies that exploit all sources of information
about the external conditions. Several models have shown
that an animal’s state should influence decision-making to
the extent that behaviour may appear irrational [38–41].
Here, we have identified that the effect of energetic reserves
may be more complex still: animals with equal levels of
reserves may differ in their response if they are adapted to
different environments, such as different rates of change,
because of how this affects the information content [20].
The marginal value theorem predicts that the marginal
capture rate for leaving patches of prey should be higher
when the overall prey abundance is higher, but this is often
not observed [42]. A simple rule of thumb of a constant
giving-up time results in behaviour that approximates the
optimal solution much of the time [17,43,44]. Such a rule
may be driven by some internal physiological state, involving
feedback from the gustatory system, which reflects the time
since the last prey item was consumed. Nonacs [45] showed
that including a forager’s energy reserves alters the predic-
tions of the marginal value theorem, but he also assumed
that animals could keep track of foraging success in a perfect
way. We suggest that a better approach may be to model a
gustatory state, such as stomach contents, which the animal
can use as a cue of foraging success. Our reserve-based
approach could be used to incorporate information con-
straints in many established models of animal behaviour
and decision-making.
There is currently much interest and concern about the
ability of organisms to cope with human-induced rapid
environmental change [46]. Such rapid changes will cause
there to be a mismatch between the conditions that animals
have evolved to deal with and those they actually experience.
Our results (figure 5) suggest that the details of how the
environment has changed will determine how organisms
respond. Interestingly, if environmental change causes con-
ditions to fluctuate more quickly or more slowly than in the
evolutionary past—for example, because it leads to more
extreme weather patterns—then organisms that can perceive
the current conditions directly (P) may in fact perform worse
than those that use simple rules to estimate current con-
ditions (figure 5). Which strategy class performs best
depends on whether fluctuations are more or less frequent:
if conditions now change more quickly than in the past,
then learning does best (figure 5b,d), whereas if conditions
change more slowly then simpler (e.g. reserve-based) strategy
classes not based on learning do best (figure 5f,h).
We have shown that, in a foraging context, a behavioural
strategy based only on an internal physiological state (R) can
perform so well that more sophisticated strategies, such aslearning directly from foraging outcomes (L) or accurately
perceiving current conditions (P), might not provide suffi-
cient advantages to offset their costs. It is striking that a
reserve-based strategy is more robust to error in the pattern
of environmental fluctuations than a rule based on perfect
information about current food availability. Therefore, if the
information about the environment is unreliable, we expect
selection to favour simpler strategy classes. So far, we have
been unable to prove that our methodology for finding the
best-performing reserve-based strategy actually converges
on the global optimum, rather than a local optimum (see
ESM, figure B11). However, if it is just a local optimum,
then our conclusions would be strengthened: the perform-
ance of the reserve-based strategy at its global optimum
(elsewhere in n-dimensional space) would be even better
than the one we have described here, and hence even closer
to the performance of the Bayesian learning strategy.
Similar principles could well apply in other (non-fora-
ging) contexts: any physiological or psychological state
variable that is altered by experience might function as an
efficient integrator (a ‘memory’) of past experiences. An
obvious candidate is emotions and moods, which have
been modelled mechanistically [47] and may help an
animal to adjust its behaviour adaptively when conditions
are uncertain [48,49]. In fact, in non-foraging contexts, the
state variable may have greater flexibility to act as a cue
because (unlike energy reserves) the animal does not necess-
arily depend on it for survival, so it could potentially evolve
to be more informative than energy reserves are in the fora-
ging case. One intriguing possibility is that emotional states
were initially unavoidable consequences of levels of neuro-
transmitter activity, but have been modified by selection to
provide more reliable information about recent experiences
and thereby influence cognitive decisions. If the principle
we have highlighted applies to most physiological states,
then organisms may often appear to be cognitively sophisti-
cated despite basing their decisions on relatively simple
mechanisms. Since internal states can summarize a great
deal of information about the environmental conditions,
they will reduce the selective pressure to learn directly from
the immediate outcomes of decisions. Animals are therefore
likely to be cognitively unsophisticated when they are able
to perform well using simple mechanisms.
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